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RECENT CASES.
ASSIGNMENT FOR CREDITORS-AsSIGNEE'S PURCHASE-MITCHELL V.
TYLER, 41 S. W. 422 (Ky.).-One who made an assignment for the benefit
of creditors had previously agreed to sell property on which there was a
mortgage. The property being sold on foreclosure, the assignee bought it,
and against the objection of some of the creditors took title in his own name
and then transferred it to the person to whom his assignee had agreed to
sell. Held, that the sale was valid and that the creditors were entitled to the
price the assignee got. Du Relle and White, J. J., dissented on the ground
that the creditors were entitled to have the title held for their benefit.
BANKRUPTY-PRACTICE-IN RE KELLY (Ex PARTE BERNHEIM ET AL.); 91
Fed. 5o4.-There should not be united in one petition a prayer that a debtor
be adjudged an involuntary bankrupt and a prayer for a warrant directing
the Marshal to sieze and hold his property pending the adjudication. The
proceedings are distinct and the better practice is that they should be
brought by separate petitions.
BANKRUPTCY-TAxES ON EXEMPT PROPERTY-IN RE TILDEN, 91 Fed.
5oo.-Bankruptcy act, 1898, § 64, provides that the trustees shall "pay all
taxes legally due and owing by the bankrupt." Held, that this requires the
payment of taxes on bankrupt's homestead, though it have been set apart
as exempt.
BoycOTT-CoNspIRAcy-AssocIATIoNs-BouTWELL ET AL. V. MARR
ET AL., 42 Atl. Rep. 6o7 (Vt).-A granite manufacturers' association, com-
posed of 95 per cent. of all the granite manufacturers in a certain place, was
organized for the purpose of boycotting plaintiffs. To accomplish this end
a by-law was passed which imposed a fine of $5o on any member of the
association who carried on business with one not a member, which by-law
acted directly against plaintiffs. In consequence the plaintiffs' business was
destroyed. Held, that the members of the association are liable to plaintiffs
for the actual damages caused to their business, even though they did not
try to influence persons outside the association. The court says that though
each member could lawfully withdraw his patronage from plaintiffs, and
even unite to do this, nevertheless a combination for this purpose, employing
threats or intimidation, is such an unlawful one as to make defendants liable.
COLLISION WITH BICYCLE-EVIDENCE-QUINN V. PIETRO, 59 N.Y. Supp.
41g.-In an action for wrongful death, caused by defendant driving over a
boy riding a bicycle, defendant's declaration on being arrested therefor, in
which he swore at the bicycle, and said that they were no good, were admissi-
ble to show his hostility to bicycles, and as increasing the probability that
he was indifferent to the rider's rights.
COMMON LAW-INTERSTATE COMMERCE-TELEGRAPH COMPANIES-CON-
TRACTS-CONSIDERATION-W. U. TEL. Co. v. CALL Co., 78 N. W. (Neb.)
518.-An action was brought for damages alleged to have accrued to plaintiff
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because of unjust discrimination against it by defendant, a public service
(telephone) corporation, and in favor of another patron of defendant, in the
rates charged for a contemporaneous service. Held, upon a review of the
cases, that in the absence of National legislation as to the interstate charges,
the principles of the common law ori general jurisprudence of the State of
the action will apply, and that in this State such action will lie.
CONSID RATION-CoNTRACT-CONSTRUCTION-INSMAN V. FIsx, 56 N.
Y. Supp. 33.-Plaintiff agreed to sell a certain number of shares in considera-
tion of his being appointed vice-president or consulting engineer of the com-
pany for two years at a guaranteed salary of $5,000 per year. Held, that the
salary was part of the consideration for the stock and that the defendants
were liable for it, though within the two years a receiver was, on their appli-
cation, appointed.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PRIVILEGES-KENTZ V. CITY OF MOBILE,
24 So. 952 BRowN v. CITY oF MOBILE, 25 So. 223 (Ala.).-The charter
of Mobile provides that "every third year * * * a recorder shall be
elected * * * said recorder shall be learned in the law and a practic-
ing attorney at the time of his election." Held, that the latter clause is uncon-
stitutional as violating § 2 of Article I, Alabama Constitution, which pro-
vides "that all persons resident in this State * * * are hereby declared
citizens of the State of Alabama, possessing equal civil and political rights."
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-JURY-COSTS-GRBBLE V. WILSON, 49 S. W.
736 (Tenn.).-Shannon's Tennessee, Code, § 5841, provides that the addi-
tional cost of a special jury shall be taxed to the losing party. Held, unconf
stitutional as violating that provision of the Tennessee Constitution which
provides that the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. It destroys
the impartiality of the jury by offering an inducement to find in favor of a
party who could not pay costs and against one who could.
CoRPoRATIoNs-AssEssMENTS--STOCK IN NAmE or AGENT-HOUGHTON
V. HUBBELL, 91 Fed. 453.-One buying shares in a national bank had them
transferred to his agents. The bank became insolvent and an assessment
was ordered on the stock. Held, that parol evidence was admissible to show
who was the real owner of the stock and that he was liable on the assess-
ment
CORPORATIONS-STocK SUBSCRIPTIONS-COLE Lr AL. V. ADAMS, 49 S.W.
1052 (Tex.).-Property conveyed in payment of a stock subscription is not to
be considered as a payment except to the extent of its money or actual value.
This is so, notwithstanding a different and higher valuation was made at the
time in good faith by the corporation and subscriber.
CIMINAL LAw-CouRT'S PREJUDICIAL REmAREs-PRovINcE OF JURY-
PEOPLE V. HILL, 56 N. Y. Supp. 282.-In cross-examining a witness the
counsel for the State asked a question which the witness tried several times
to evade, upon which the court directed him to "answer the question and
stop quibbling." Held, that the remarks of the court was an invasion of the
province of the jury as tending to carry the idea to them that the court
believed the witness was evading the truth.
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CRIMINAL LAW-PRESUMPTIONS-STATE V. SOPER, 49 S. W. 1007 (Mo.).
-Where one is charged with the murder of his wife, there is no additional
presumption of innocence because of the marital relations between him and
his wife. Leabo's Case, 84 Mo. I68, criticised.
CUSTOMS DUTIES-VALUATION-AMERICAN .SUGAR REFINING CO. V.
U. S., 9i Fed. 646.-Section io, Customs Act, i8go, provides appraisers shall
ascertain the actual market value and wholesale price of the merchandise,
at the time of exportation to the United States, in the principal markets of
the country whence the same has been imported. Certain sugars imported
from Brazil lose from L4 to 16 per cent. in weight by drainage during the
voyage, but the market price is increased in proportion to the loss of weight.
Held, that the valuation on the cargo actually received may be increased in
this proportion.
DAMAGES-INJURY TO LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEER-CROUSE V. CHICAGO
& N. W. Ry. Co., 78 N. W. (Wis.) 446.-In an action for personal injuries,
held, that plaintiff can recover as damages the services rendered him 'by his
wife in nursing him.
DEED--CoNSTRUCTION-BUILDING RESTRICTIONS-SONN V. HEILBERG,
56 N. Y. Supp. 341.-A deed contained a covenant "not to erect any build-
ing * * * less than three stories in height, and the same to be in every
way adapted for use as a family residence." Held, that the covenant was not
broken by the erection of an apartment house. Bartlett and Woodward, J. J.,
dissenting.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-CONVEYANCE TO WIFE-REScISSION-FRAuD-
EQUITABLE RELIEF-BASYE V. BASYE, 52 N. E. Rep. 797 (Ind.).-A wife
fraudulently procured a voluntary conveyance from her husband by sham-
ming affection for him and promising to be a dutiful wife, but intending to
abandon him and procure a divorce as soon as the conveyance was made.
Field, that the conveyance would be set aside for fraud, since her promises
as to future conduct and representation as to her affection were representa-
tions of present facts, and not merely unfulfilled promises.
INSOLVENT NATIONAL BANKS-DIVIDENDS TO SECURED CREDITORS-
MERRILL V. NATIONAL BANE, I Sup. Ct. Rep. 36o.-A secured creditor of
an insolvent national bank may prove and receive dividends upon the face
of his claim as.it stood at the time of the declaration of insolvency, without
crediting either his collaterals or collections made therefrom after such
declaration, subject always to the proviso that dividends must cease when,
from them and from collaterals realized, the claim has been paid in full.
White, J., vigorously dissents (after an exhaustive review of American and
English bankruptcy acts and cases thereon), maintaining that this result is
against the purpose of the Act of June 30, 1876 (ig Stat. 63, c. 156), and in
particular against § 5236 thereof, requiring the comptroller to make a
"ratable dividend" on recognized claims out of assets in the receiver's hands.
Harlan, McKenna, and Gray concurring.
LIFE TENANT-DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY-INSURANCE-SAMPSON ET
Ux. v. GROGAN, 42 At. Rep. 712 (R. I.).-A will devised a house and lot to
one for life, the devisee to keep the same in repair. The house was coin-
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pletely destroyed by fire.- The life tenant had an insurance policy on the
building covering her interest tfierein. Held, that the life tenant
was not obliged to rebuild and that the remainder man could recover no
part of the insurance money-nor was the life tenant liable for waste. The
decision gives an exhaustive history of liability for waste in like cases.
MARRIED WOMEN'S CONTRACTS-PRESUMPTIONS-WARNER V. HESS, 49
S. W. 489 (Ark.).-Under the Arkansas statutes, which permit a married
woman to contract with reference to her services her separate estate and
separate business carried on by her, a contract made by her is prima facie
invalid. Riddick, J., dissenting.
MUNICIPAL CoRPoRATIoNS-ANNExATioN OF TERRITORY-GIEsON V.
WOOD, 49 S. W. 768 (Ky.)-The charter of the city of Louisville provides
that "no person shall be eligible to any office who is not at the time of his
election a qualified voter of the city, and who has not resided therein three
years preceding his election." Held, that one who has resided in one place for
three years, which place some two months before the election became a
part of the city, was eligible for an office under the Louisville charter, though
up to that time his place of residence had not been a part of the city.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-INDEBTEDNESs--LIMIT-CITY OF CHICAGO
v. MCDONALD, 52 N. E. Rep. 982 (IH.).-Constitution, i87O, Article 9, § 12,
prohibited a city from becoming indebted, in any manner or for any purpose,
to an amount exceeding five per cent. of the taxable value of its property.
Held, that in determining this indebtedness the cash in the city treasury and
uncollected taxes should not be deducted. Cartwright and Phillips, J. 3,
dissenting.
ORDINANCES-REASONABLENESS-COVERING FOR FRUIT-FROST V. CITY
OF CHICAGO, 52 N. E. Rep. 869 (Ill.).-An ordinance provided: "It shall be
and is hereby made unlawful to cover any box, basket, or any other package
or parcel of fruit, berries or vegetables of any kind, with any colored netting,
or any other material which has a tendency to conceal the true color or
quality of any such goods which may be sold, offered for sale or had in
possession for the purpose of being sold or offered for sale." Held, void as
an unreasonable interference with and restriction upon the rights of dealers
in certain articles of trade and commerce.
PATENTS-PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION-HORN & BRANNEN Co. v.
PELZER, 91 Fed. 665-Appellee took out a patent in 1882. In 1891 this patent
was adversely ruled upon, and in 1894 he surrendered the patent and applied
for a re-issue, which was granted in 1895. Meanwhile various patents were
issued, among which was one which covered the manufacture of the appel-
lant. The Circuit Court of Appeals in the second circuit held the re-issued
patent valid. Held, on a consideration of the facts as above and of the
patent, that though the general rule is a preliminary injunction against in-
fringement will be granted where the patent in question has been adjudged
valid in another circuit, that it would be refused here. Butler, D. J., dis-
sented.
POLICE POWER-ScHOOLS--COMPULSORY VACCINATION OF PUPILS-
PEOPLE EX REL. LABAUGH V. BOARD OF EDUCATION, 52 N. E. Rep. 85o (Ill.).
-A rule adopted by the State Board of Health compelling the vaccination of
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children as a prerequisite to their attending the public schools is unreason-
able where smallpox does not exist in the community, and there is no reason-
able cause to apprehend its appearance. The power to compel the vaccina-
tion of children is derived from the general police power of the State, and
can only be justified as a necessary means for preserving health.
RAILROADS-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-SAN ANTONIO & A. P. Ry.
Co. v. GREEN, 49 S. W. 67o (Tex.).-Plantiff, while running to a fire, found
the street blocked by a railway train, not then in motion. He was climbing
over the train, when it started and he was injured. Other people were climb-
ing the train at the same time. Held, he was not guilty of contributory
negligence.
SERVANTS-WHo ARE FELLOW SERvANTs-C. & A. Ry. Co. v. SwAN, 52
N. E. Rep. 916 (Ill.).-Held, that a baggageman on the train was not a fellow
servant of the engineer on the same train.
SUIT AGAINST A STATE-GROSS V. KENTUCEY BOARD OF MANAGERS OF
WORLD'S COLUMBIAN EXPOSITION, 49 S. W. 458 (Ky.).-The State of Ken-
tucky created a Board of Managers to provide for the representation of the
State at the World's Fair. These managers were to be appointed by the
Governor, and the money they were to use was State money and the pro-
ceeds of the renting of part of a building erected with this State money. The
board had power to make contracts, but were not personally interested in the
business. Held, that the board was a quasi-corporation and could be sued.
Paynter and Guffy, J. J., dissented on the ground that this was a suit against
the State.
TRADE NAME-INjuNcTIoN-AMERIcAN WALTHAM WATCH CO. V.
UNITED STATES WATCH Co., 53 N. E. Rep. 141 (Mass.).-Held, that where
a manufacturer of watches in the city of Waltham had acquired a great repu-
tation, and had used the word "Waltham" originally in a mere geographical
sense in connection with his watches, but such word had, by long use, come
to have a secondary meaning, as a designation of the watches which the
public had been accustomed to associate with the name, another person be-
ginning the manufacture of watches a long time thereafter would be enjoined
against using the words "Waltham" or "Waltham, Mass.," upon plates of
its watches, without some statement distinguishing them from watches made
by plaintiff.
